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In light of recent epidemiological literature, it appears that the expansion 
of Medicaid via the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is in 
the self-interest of Americans living at or below 133% the Federal Poverty 
Line (FPL). However, an assessment of public opinion data reveals that much of 
this subpopulation is expressing opposition to the reform.  Such a finding is 
surprising in that it flows against the hierarchy of needs described by 
psychologist Abraham Maslow’s (1943) theory of human motivation.  In the 
context of greater mass opinion on the bill and literature on the behavior of the 
electorate, I set up a model to evaluate which factors motivate this opposition. 
This paper hypothesizes that a respondent’s opinion of PPACA is dependent on 
party ID, ideological concerns about government, level of political involvement, 
and even racial attitudes.  However, it is not dependent on anxiety about paying 
for healthcare bills, nor a desire to improve health outcomes. In order to 
evaluate this hypothesis I use a logistic regression.   In confirming my 
hypothesis I then ask what such an occurrence shows us about the relationship 
between policy preference, political sophistication, and Party ID and what 
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In the summer of 2009 I worked as a research assistant in the University 
of Michigan Department of Molecular and Integrative Physiology.  As a new 
employee I spent the majority of my time learning basic laboratory techniques, 
cleaning glassware, and preparing materials for the experiments.  However, on 
one occasion, when asked to edit parts of the laboratory’s National Institute of 
Health grant, I spent a considerable amount of time investigating the barriers 
associated with treatment of Type II diabetes.  It was during this time that I 
became aware of the harsh, yet unmistakable, truth that a significant factor 
contributing to the increased severity of Type II diabetes in the U.S. was a lack 
of health insurance and preventative treatment.   
In many ways it was this, and also my recognition that working in a 
laboratory setting was not my true calling, that provoked my interest in the 
healthcare policy and law of the United States.   As my awareness of these 
problems grew, so too grew newly elected President Obama’s promises that his 
comprehensive healthcare reform bill would ensure health security for the 
millions of Americans who were living without it.  
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On March 23, 2010 President Obama signed this legislation into law, 
though great opposition existed and quickly denigrated PPACA.  In its words 
there appeared to be help for those without proper coverage, yet there are 
undoubtedly controversial components of the law. From an individual insurance 
mandate with penalties that fights adverse selection in the insurance pool, to the 
establishment of state-based insurance exchanges to facilitate market-based 
cost control, many elements of this healthcare law have met resistance from a 
variety of players in both the private and public sector.  However, the 2000 
pages of this legislation include an expansion of the Medicaid program to persons 
under 133% the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) and subsidization for the buying of 
insurance in the state-based exchanges for persons up to 400% FPL.   
For the American poor then there appeared to be one inarguable truth: 
PPACA would provide them health insurance and security.  In the case of many 
who had previously been unable to afford it before, this would be a first 
opportunity to receive medical care.  One would thus expect this subpopulation 
to be thrilled by its passage.  However, in following public opinion data 
surrounding the bill, and speaking with various people around the country, such a 
conclusion appeared increasingly deviant from reality.  This paper, based on the 
assumption that PPACA is in the objective interest of Americans below 133% 
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FPL, wants to understand why public opinion takes the form it does, (with low 
income individuals opposing it) given that poor people would potentially benefit 
from this new law. 
My research hopes to evaluate the motivations that fuel American public 
opinion of PPACA, assessing whether partisan identity, civic-duty, pragmatism, 
or response to party elite discourse may be trumping the potential physiological 
and safety benefits of gaining health insurance. While such an action is not 
without precedent, it does flow against the hierarchy of human motivation that 
Abraham Maslow (1943) describes in his “Theory of Human Motivation.”  
This paper will briefly discuss his theory, while also showing how public opinion 
surrounding PPACA runs counter to its intuitions. 
Given the finding that many Americans under 133% FPL are expressing 
opinion against a policy that could improve their health outcomes and financial 
stability, this paper posits that partisan motivated reasoning and party elite-led 
proxy voting help explain this phenomenon.  To clarify the impact of such 
reasoning I begin this paper with an analogy for which I owe much gratitude to 
Erick W. Groenendyk (2009) and his dissertation: The Motivated Partisan: A 
Dual Motivation Theory of Partisan Change and Stability.  While in and of itself 
the notion of partisan reasoning and expression are not overtly convoluted, the 
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illustration of these themes through a comparison to sports fan hood is 
particularly useful.  As both fan hood and party identification are so often 
predominant features of identity, I find such a poignant parallel a perfect place 
to start.  More, I would hope, or suppose, that many who read this may as well 
















Growing up in the suburbs of Boston, there was only one choice: eat, 
sleep, and breathe Red Sox baseball or get in your car and drive to Yankee 
Stadium.  Encompassed in a culture of passionate fan hood and dedication, it is 
easy to appreciate the joys of being a Boston Red Sox sports fan. The collective 
notion of community, the moments of victory and celebration, and the nights 
spent with friends reveling in the often-turbulent features of the game, all 
speak to the glory-rich elements of one’s fan hood. Yet, as any sports fans may 
know, particularly any Boston baseball fan, team allegiances are readily tested, 
especially when balls roll through legs and losing streaks seem to occur right 
around playoff time.  The temptation to switch one’s allegiances to the front-
runner is frequent, yet we all hold back, as wearing a Yankees hat would lead to 
exile and humiliation.  
The maintenance of identity and personhood, as psychology has now long 
acknowledged, is a driving motivator of human action and decision-making.  As 
cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1956) and motivated reasoning (Kunda 
1990) suggest, humans often try to create consistency between their narrative 
of identity and their actions, or in the latter case, to interpret information 
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detrimental to the core ideals of this identity as a cause to solidify it.  To put it 
in other words, with regards to Festinger (1956), to swear by the luck of a rally 
cap even though it has never worked in getting your team a hit, and in regards 
to (Kunda 1990,) to truly convince yourself that the Yankee’s Derek Jeter is 
the worst shortstop in baseball history. 
Like sports fan hood, political party is a core element of American 
identity.  I will elaborate on this point later, but much literature (Campbell et al. 
1960, Green, Palmquist and Schiclker 2002) shows the consistency of 
individual level party identification across time, and likewise reveals examples of 
reasoning on policy issues motivated by party ID. Certainly though, the 
similarities between sports fan hood and that of political party affiliation do end.  
Although at times many do indeed gripe that the failures of their sports team 
are equivalent to problems such as world hunger, there is an undoubted 
distinction here: the implications of one’s staunchness to remain true to a sports 
team, in the end, do not threaten the function of policymaking, or government, 
or the individual himself.  Conversely, partisan motivation and the use of party 
discourse as a proxy to supplement information deficiencies, wherein a 
developed party identification largely governs opinion of a complex healthcare 
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reform, has important implications for policymaking, for the citizenry, and for 
the use of public opinion data as a guide for legislators.   
Despite the cautions of our forefathers, political parties have not only 
become engrained in the U.S. processes of government, but individual partisan 
identities are salient features of American culture.  Such distinctions between 
party—Republicans vs. Democrats, Elephants vs. Donkeys, Red States vs. Blue 
States—are frequent in the media and cultural imagery.  Additionally Converse’s 
(1964) argument that the majority of Americans have ever-shifting ideological 
beliefs and low access to political information reveals the importance of the 
stability of individual level party identification in America, as it serves as one of 
the only constants.  Additionally, there is no arguing that the American public at 
the time of PPACA is at a historical level of partisan divisiveness.  
Undoubtedly such strong partisan identification promotes the use of party 
as a proxy to guide policy preference in the absence of political knowledge. The 
concept that individuals can use signals to supplement a lack of political 
sophistication has been argued by (Lupia 1994, Popkin 1994).  Together this 
literature posits that voter competence is not a necessary condition for casting 
votes that mimic informed peers, as proxies may substitute knowledge.  
However, while proxies can suffice to prompt a voter to make the same decision 
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of his competent counterpart, this study addresses a case wherein the proxies 
of partisanship that individuals are relying on due to lack of information about 
PPACA run counter to their objective interest. Other studies (Bartels 1996) 
have shown that while proxies may serve as a partial substitute for low political 
sophistication, they are not wholly capable of replacing political competence.  
This paper describes such an occurrence, one where the proxy signals do not 
equate with the objective interest of the individual, and also briefly assesses the 
implications of such a reality on the functioning of democratic government and 
healthcare policymaking.   
Here I have outlined how party ID operates in order to set a foundation 
for the analysis included in this paper.  As I will examine in the discussion of my 
results, expression of opposition to PPACA by those living at or below 133% 
FPL, while it flows against Abraham Maslow’s theory of human motivation, is 
explainable by the literature on party ID and proxy-led voting.  I maintain that 
partisan motivated reasoning, which is mediated by a stable individual level party 
ID, promotes the consideration of specific ideological concerns as the 
determinant of proxy selection.  This, in turn, prompts an opposition to PPACA 
absent of a sincere consideration of the pros and cons of the policy.  
This paper proceeds with these two foundations—that individual level 
party ID in America is stable and a primary source of resistance to contrary 
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influence, and that the majority of Americans have low awareness of political 
information—and evaluates whether these are determinants of opposition to 
PPACA among those at or below 133% FPL, despite the fact that PPACA is in 
their objective interest.   
In Chapter 1 this thesis outlines the effects of PPACA and evaluates the 
impact of Medicaid expansion on the American poor.  Herein I point out the 
changes to Medicaid coverage enumerated in the law, showing that for virtually 
every individual living at or below 133% FPL, irrelevant of whether that 
individual previously had health insurance, the quality of coverage and breadth of 
available services will improve under PPACA.  Although this in and of itself 
points to the fact that PPACA is in the self-interest of individuals living at or 
below this income level, Chapter 2 highlights the work of Baicker et al. (2011), 
an epidemiological study of new Medicaid enrollees in Oregon, to show that the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), via the expansion of the 
Medicaid program to cover Americans up to 133% FPL, is in the self-interest of 
Americans living at or below this income level. This study by the Oregon Health 
Study Group reveals that the uptake of Medicaid insurance improves the status 
of an individual’s physical, mental, and financial condition.   
With this study as the foundation, I move into Chapter 3, where I 
compare public opinion of healthcare policy from the 1940s through 1970s to 
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the failures of the Clinton Health Security Act and the current state of support 
and resistance in regards to PPACA. Here I pay particular attention to the 
relationship between health policy preference and party ID over time. This 
analysis suggests that the opposition to federally run healthcare reform was not 
always this strong, even though partisanship has remained relatively unchanged.  
Therefore, this suggests that the link observed between party ID and health 
reform mass opinion, with respect to the Clinton HSA and PPACA bill, is a 
relatively novel development of American politics. 
Proceeding into Chapter 4, I introduce the American National Election 
Study (ANES) EGSS 1, 2, & 3 data sets.  This study asks if any Americans at or 
below 133% FPL are expressing opposition to PPACA despite its extension of 
federally funded Medicaid by 2014. An analysis of this empirical evidence 
reveals that there is a significant proportion of this study population expressing 
an opinion that appears to be against their self-interest. I then evaluate the 
opposition to PPACA among this subpopulation in the context of Abraham 
Maslow’s (1943) theory of human motivation. Finding that such an action goes 
against the intuitions of this theory, in Chapter 5, I couple empirical assessments 
with existing literature on past healthcare reform efforts (Cutler and Gruber 
2001), electoral behavior (Campbell et al 1960, Converse 1964) and 
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information shortcuts (Lupia 1994, Popkin 1994), to create a model that may 
be predictive of a respondent’s likelihood to oppose or support PPACA.   
This paper argues that opinion of PPACA is dependent on the collective 
forces of political party identification, ideological concerns about proper role of 
government, and level of political involvement.  However, it is not, as one may 
expect, dependent on the issue itself, anxiety about paying for healthcare bills, 
or a desire to improve health outcomes. In Chapter 6, the paper uses a logistic 
regression model to evaluate this hypothesis, and in Chapter 7 I discuss these 
results using the abovementioned literature on party ID and information 
shortcuts.  This paper posits that the results of this regression can be explained 
by the use of partisan proxies to supplement a lack of information about the bill, 
the selection of which is mediated by partisan motivated reasoning.  Although 
Republican partisans and party elite are in vocal opposition to PPACA, Medicaid 
expansion via PPACA is in the rational self-interest of all individuals living at or 
below 133% FPL.  Thus, in this case, it appears that proxies do not serve as a 
sufficient replacement for a lack of understanding about the bill. Additionally, 
this situation demonstrates that such ideological concerns about government and 
party identity are being put ahead of the potential improvement of health 
outcomes.  
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 In the conclusion I first assess alternative explanations for this 
opposition.  After arguing against these alternatives, I then evaluate what my 
conclusions show us about the determinants of policy preference.  And finally I 
end by asking what implications this may have for the function of democratic 
government, or more specifically, healthcare policymaking? 
In summation, using American National Election Survey (ANES) data, this 
paper shows 1) that among Americans at or below 133% the Federal Poverty 
Line (FPL) some are voting against their objective interest, 2) that this 
opposition stems from the use of a developed Republican party identification as 
a proxy to determine opinion, 3) that a distrust in or ideological resentment with 
the federal government weighs heavily in these partisan considerations, 4) that 
limited access to political information promotes opposition to PPACA, and 5) 
that even when the respondent has concerns about paying medical bills, there 








—Chapter 1. PPACA & the U.S. Healthcare System— 
 
 
“And we have now just enshrined , as soon as I sign this bill , 
the core principle that everybody should have some basic 
security when it comes to their healthcare .” 
 
      --President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010 in his speech 
      at the signing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
 
 
I. PPACA & The American Poor 
 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act signed into law in March 
23, 2010 by Barack Obama expands the Medicaid program to cover all of the 
lowest-income Americans, many of whom were previously ineligible for this 
coverage. This change primarily extends coverage to adults who were 
previously ineligible for Medicaid, since all states already provide public coverage 
to the lowest income children through Medicaid and the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP). The health reform law will institute an expansion of 
eligibility to every American living at or below 133% of the federal poverty 
level (Kaiser 2, 2010). Likewise PPACA provides access to insurance for 
persons under 400% FPL through sliding-scale subsidies in the state-based 
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insurance exchanges1. This expansion establishes a national foundation of 
coverage based on income and ends the historic exclusion of individuals from 
Medicaid coverage based on family status [i.e. marital status, or number of 
dependents], which was a “lingering vestige of the program’s early ties to 
welfare” (Kaiser 2, 2010). Additionally, as is more frequently focused on in 
the public and media arena, PPACA includes an individual mandate that requires 
all Americans to purchase health insurance at the risk of a penalty. This latter 
element of the law has been defended in the name of combating the heightening 
of healthcare costs due to adverse selection in the insurance pool, and reproved 
in the name of socialism and big government.2  
As evident from President Obama’s remarks at the signing, the aim of this 
healthcare reform is to promote the health security of those who could not 
previously afford it. Prior to the passage of this reform, enrollment in Medicaid 
was restricted to the poorest of the poor and those with families. Now, through 
the expansion of the Medicaid program to all Americans at or below 133% FPL, 
                                                
1 PPACA establishes insurance exchange, or state –based insurance marketplaces in which the 
Federal government provides purchasing assistance to people  up to 400% FPL with an inverse 
relationship to their income. 
2 The concept of adverse selection has been described often in recent discussions of PPACA, as 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg said recently: "Those who don’t participate in health care make it 
more expensive for everyone else.”  Talking about the constitutionality she adds that "it is not 
your free choice" to stay out of the market for life, she said. 
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the PPACA provides insurance for all poor Americans. By aiming to combat the 
rise of health expenditures through the individual mandate and the provision of 
access to those who previously could not afford it, it is not necessarily 
surprising that the reform has met resistance from a variety of sectors.  Calls 
for taxes on “Cadillac” health insurance plans have fueled outrage amongst 
many wealthier Americans, and changes in the regulations on providing 
employee sponsored insurance have aggravated some employers facing tight 
budgets. Across the spectrum of income, age, and employment there are 
certainly Americans who have an arguably valid reason to see the PPACA as 
opposing their self-interest.  
This paper will include an overview of the public opinion surrounding the 
PPACA, noting especially the massive partisan gap in public opinion with 
Republicans heavily in opposition and Democrats heavily in support. However, as 
this paper will convey based on lines of research in both psychology and 
epidemiology, for Americans at or below 133% FPL, receipt of medical 
insurance through the expansion of the Medicaid program under PPACA is in 




II. A Need for Change 
Such health reform in the U.S., while difficult to achieve, was apparently 
necessary. Worldwide, the U.S. ranks first in healthcare spending at 16.2% of 
GDP, yet 37th in terms of efficiency and quality (WHO 2000).  High administrative 
costs, overuse of medical technology, and the fee-for-service model all 
contribute to excess cost. Even after factoring out the linear relationship between 
wealth and health spending, U.S. excess healthcare spending still totals $477B—
$281B from input costs, $147B from inefficient and complex system delivery 
(non-clinical labor, medical malpractice insurance), $68B from system 
administration and regulation, and $36B from miscellaneous outpatient spending.  
This means that we spend “$1,645 per capita more on healthcare than peer 
countries” (Agrisano 2007).  These surplus costs have increased insurance prices, 
further perpetuating the inequality between those who can afford care and those 
who cannot.  Although it is agreed that the system has inherent structural flaws, it 
is the American values of liberty and choice that make the institution of a single-
payer system a political impossibility.  In face of such barriers, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) controversially mandates health 
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insurance, extends the availability and affordability of coverage, and implements a 
wide array of cost-control mechanisms. 
 The government insurance mandate, enforced by a noncompliance penalty 
of $750, adds 32 million newly insured Americans by 2014, leaving the rate of 
uninsured at roughly 7.3% based on estimates (Commonwealth Fund 2010). As 
previously mentioned, in order to eliminate the excess costs that result from 
adverse selection, it is essential to distribute the cost of healthcare for the 
population across a larger number of individuals. This mandate successfully puts 
the American population in a consortium, thus combating adverse selection and 
curbing costs in the long-term. Through this extension of coverage, PPACA is 
estimated to “bend the curve” in healthcare costs, adding only $311B in 
healthcare costs from 2010-2019—which works out to less than $1000 per 
newly insured person (Commonwealth Fund 2010). 3 
Furthermore, PPACA calls for novel insurance exchanges, which are 
“state-based marketplaces [that] will offer small businesses and people without 
employer-coverage a choice of affordable health plans” (Commonwealth Fund 
2010).  From such exchanges come several potential benefits. Due to the fact that 
                                                
3 This estimate is based on the effect of community rating, which lowers per capita costs and 
beneficially slows of the rate of cost increase. 
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plans must meet certain standards in order to be included in the exchange, quality 
regulation is built into the structural framework.  An additional benefit is that these 
exchanges include choices such as Medicaid coverage via private insurance 
providers.  Because the government will hand over 32 million new customers to 
the private sector under PPACA, private insurers were willing to cooperate.  As a 
result of their desire to participate in the exchanges, insurers agreed to no longer 
decline coverage to those with preexisting conditions, nor drop them when they 
come down with a costly disease or injury.   
Beyond the reforms to insurance, PPACA calls for a variety of cost and 
quality oversights.  Within the pages of the law, there are a plethora of provisions 
related to these issues.  Some of these measures include the establishment of 
regulatory boards such as the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, which 
will evaluate and recommend cost-effective care practices.  Other measures, such 
as stricter capitation and reimbursement rates for Medicare, have a more direct 
influence on cost-control (Commonwealth Fund 2010). Likewise, PPACA puts no 
annual cap on Medicare and Medicaid spending despite excess costs.   
Most importantly though, at least in the context of this study, is the fact 
that PPACA will expand the Medicaid program to cover all of the lowest-income 
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Americans (133% FPL or below).   Traditionally Medicaid had strict eligibility 
requirements, of which an income level at or below 100% FPL was just one of.  
Included in these eligibility requirements were marital status and number of 
dependent children.  As a result, the vast majority of childless non-elderly 
adults currently do not receive Medicaid from the federal government.  Though 
states have stepped in to provide coverage to some of this population, the 
majority of them do not provide a quality or degree of coverage that compares 
to Medicaid.  Through PPACA it is expected that “32 million of the 46 million 
[American uninsured] will gain access to insurance under the new law, half of 
which will do so via Medicaid”(Hislop 2010). It is this significant feature of the 









—Chapter 2. The Assumption of Self-Interest— 
I.  Is Health Insurance good for one’s Health? 
While the benefit of improved and expanded Medicaid support is clear for 
the millions of Americans who are undergoing care and need assistance to pay 
for it, what about the remaining population living at this income level who are 
currently in good health?  Does having insurance under the Medicaid program 
retain benefits even when an individual is not in need of care?  How does 
Medicaid insurance correlate with measures of mental illness, including 
depression? What about financial security? All of these questions are essential if 
we are to evaluate public opinion with the assumption that the expansion of 
Medicaid to all Americans under 133% FPL via PPACA is in the self-interest of 
the respondents.   
There have been a number of studies by health policy experts that 
provide support for the notion that health insurance improves health outcomes.  
One study by Bernstien, Chollet, and Peterson (2010) from Mathematica Policy 
Research Inc. argues that having health insurance is a determinant of both health 
outcomes and financial security.  Though this study is not focused on Medicaid, 
it provides support for the argument that having health insurance yields better 
health outcomes. These authors include a number of points that reveal the 
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beneficial effects of having insurance coverage.  Firstly, they estimate that the 
number of premature deaths per year in the U.S. attributable to lack of 
insurance is approximately 44,500.  With the assumption that death is not in 
the objective interest of uninsured Americans, it appears that having health 
insurance should be something desired.  They additionally contend that a large 
reason for this increased likelihood of premature death is due to the fact that 
uninsured adults are far less likely to receive preventative services, such as 
mammograms, pap smears, or prostate screenings.  More so, uninsured adults 
are 20% less likely to receive care following an automobile accident, have higher 
rates of stroke and risk of death, are more likely to have neurological 
impairment, have longer hospital stays, and are at a greater risk of dying than 
their insured peers. This study concludes: 
“Vulnerable populations are especially at risk of poor health outcomes 
when they are uninsured.  Insurance coverage can also improve social and 
economic well-being, by averting developmental problems in children, 
increasing workforce productivity, decreasing use of hospital services, and 
reducing costs of public programs.”  
       --(Bernstein, Chollet, and Peterson 2010). 
 
Though such a study is useful, the easiest critique to using it as a 
foundation for the assumption that Medicaid insurance mimics such effects is 
one that focuses on the divide between the quality of private insurance plans 
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and that of Medicaid insurance.  Luckily, though, a recent study has made such a 
consideration unnecessary, as under some unique circumstances it has examined 
the effects of Medicaid insurance itself. 
II. How About Medicaid? 
Baicker et al. (2011) provides a groundbreaking study on the benefits of 
being enrolled in Medicaid insurance.  For health policy experts, this study has 
been hailed as the gold standard of proof that having health insurance is good for 
your health, and more specifically, that Medicaid insurance is indeed beneficial 
for your health.  The authors state, “consistent with an improved overall sense 
of well-being, there is evidence in the later survey of a substantial (32 
percent) increase in self-reported overall happiness…overall, the evidence 
suggests that people feel better off due to insurance.”  They also contend 
“there is evidence of improvement in self-reported mental and physical health 
measures, perceived access to and quality of care, and overall well-being.” 
Additionally, as mentioned in the study by Bernstein, Chollet, and Peterson 
(2010) a large reason for premature death amongst the uninsured is a lack of 
preventative screenings.  Baicker et al.’s (2011) findings show that use of 
medical screening technologies is increased greatly among Medicaid recipients. 
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This work does stress that it is essential for health policy experts to wait 
for further results, including blood tests and other physical measurements of 
health.  This caution is important in that self-reported physical state may not 
truly represent definitively improved health outcomes.  While we thus must 
take these findings with a grain of salt, the same restrictions are not necessary 
for issues of mental health. As Baicker et al (2011) states: 
“For mental health, the self-reported and subjective nature of the 
questions is less of an issue, since diagnosis of depression, by its nature, relies 
on such self-reports; the depression screen we use correlates highly with 
clinical diagnoses of depression.”  
 
 
It is also important to note the author’s warnings against the extrapolation 
of their data onto national health reform.  Though these warnings seem to 
invalidate my use of this work to argue that PPACA is in the objective interest 
of Americans below 133% FPL, this is not the case.  Such cautions are not 
applicable to the part of Baicker et al.’s (2011) study that discusses the 
increase in self-reported health outcome amongst Medicaid recipients.  The 
rationale for their warnings about applying the conclusions to the national reform 
is largely focused on the economic facets of the Medicaid expansion.  Though 
this does not warrant the dismissal of the aforementioned disclaimer, an analysis 
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of the economic elements of Medicaid expansion are important to note, 
especially in light of the public opinion split that I will discuss later.  
 It is certainly not surprising that those who are affected more severely 
by changes in federal spending would oppose the expansion of Medicaid to cover 
those living at 133% FPL and thus, oppose PPACA.  Especially amongst those 
who will likely bear the weight of increased taxation to cover the initial growth 
of federal healthcare expenditures, opposition to the reform is defendable.   
Though these concerns are crucial to the debate about the potential of 
this health reform, they are not central to the argument laid out in this paper.  
Even if the economic future of the country may be uncertain, it is still surprising 
that those living at 133% FPL or below would put these concerns ahead of their 
own self-interest in obtaining federally funded health insurance.  In other 
words, if such concerns about the economic future of the country motivate 
healthcare reform opinion, it reveals that a sense of civic duty may be trumping 






—Chapter 3: The State of Public Opinion of PPACA— 
Prior to the analysis of ANES survey data it is particularly useful to 
examine the findings of the Kaiser Permanente Health Tracking Polls.  Not only 
do the polls provide a detailed picture regarding the shifts in public opinion of 
PPACA over time, but also illustrate the motivations and characteristics of 
Americans on each side of the issue. Starting in March of 2010, following the 
passage of the bill, and continuing through the writing of this paper, the Kaiser 
Health Tracking Polls have examined the state of public opinion surrounding the 
PPACA. Likewise, the polls provide insight into the motivations behind American 
sentiment on this policy.  A majority of the suspicions and hypotheses that 
guide the later binary logistic regression model are derived from intutitions 
presented in these tracking polls by Kaiser. 
I. The Rationales for Support & Opposition  
One useful element of the health tracking polls is the inclusion of selected 
quotes from open-ended responses.  Such qualitative data provide insight into 
the rationales that individual respondents are using to determine their position 
on healthcare reform in it is entirety and by its various elements.   
In terms of the individual mandate portion of PPACA, it is intriguing to 
note the divergent rationales people supply for their opinion of the reform.  In a 
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look at Figure 1, those who have a favorable opinion of the individual mandate 
appear concerned about individual purchasing power, equity of healthcare, and 
functionality of the reform.  On the other hand, if we look at responses by 
those people who have an unfavorable opinion of the individual mandate, we 
notice concerns about proper role, size, and function of government, and also 
those of an economic nature.  It appears from these responses that those who 
support this individual mandate portion are influenced primarily about concerns 
of health insurance security and equity, while those who oppose the individual 
mandate are influenced primarily by concerns over government role and 
expenditure.  Though by no means conclusive, or inarguable, these intuitions are 
helpful in creating a model that describes the motivating factors of opposition as 









Figure 1: “In Their Own Words (Selected Quotes from Open-Ended 









II. A Divided Public: Reminiscent of the Clinton Era 
In looking at Figure 2, we can see that around the time of the passage of 
the bill in April 2010, and continuing through most of the year, PPACA received 
almost majority support, or at least more favorable views of the bill than 
unfavorable ones.  However, in more recent polls, starting in January of 2011, 
both unfavorable views of PPACA and views that indicate a lack of information 
regarding the bill have grown in quantity.  In a similar fashion public opinion of 
healthcare reform efforts in recent U.S. history have followed declines in 
support.  The most notable example of this decline is that which surrounded the 
Clinton Health Security Act, proposed first in 1993. As the paper (Cutler and 
Gruber 2001) states, “When the administration began designing its health 
reform plan in the spring of 1993, 71 percent of people approved of what they 
heard about the plan.  By the middle of 1994, only 33 percent of people 







Figure 2: “Public Remains Largely Split on ACA” (Brodie 2011) 
 
III. The Partisan Split 
In light of such a divided public opinion of the bill, it is essential for this 
study to characterize those who support or have favorable views of the bill and 
those who are against or have unfavorable views of the bill.  In terms of 
continuing the comparison with public opinion on Clinton’s Health Security Act, it 
is sensible to investigate whether the prescriptions made by the literature about 
the HSA are relevant to PPACA.  The most notable, yet unsurprising, point 
made by those studying the fate of the HSA is that the failure of the bill was a 
direct result of politics.    
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As (Cutler and Gruber 2001) state: 
 
“The first explanation for the failure of the HSA was politics.  Far right 
Republican leaders were beginning to assert their power over the Republican 
Party, and saw defeating the Health Security act as a key to doing so.  Newt 
Gingrich led the opposition to the HSA and was followed by other, like-minded 
Republicans.  This was combined with intense lobbying from groups opposed to 
aspects of the HSA.  Most prominent among these were the National Federation 
of Independent Businesses (NFIB), the trade group for small businesses, and 
the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), the lobbying organization 
for health insurers.” 
 
If we look at Figure 3, it appears that though the passage of the bill 
overcame political obstacles, there is still a partisan dogfight in the war of public 
opinion.  Assessing the data collected by Kaiser, such that is visible in Figure 3, 











Figure 3: “Independents Nearly as Divided by Partisan Leanings as 
Public Overall” (Brodie 2011) 
 
IV. Opposition Based on General Feelings about 
Government 
In the same way that political party identification appears to be a proxy 
for PPACA public opinion, it also appears that general sentiment about the state 
of the country motivates opinion. Before assessing this point, it is important to 
interpret this drastic divide on healthcare reform based on political party and 
political ideology in a historical context: it hasn’t always been this way.  Looking 
back to the mid 1960s, according to a Gallup poll released in January of 1965, 
63% of people supported a plan calling for compulsory health insurance and only 
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28% disapproved.  Additionally, according to a Harris polling at the same time, 
46% more Americans “preferred medical care funded by taxes” while 36% 
favored a plan of expanded private health insurance” (Erskine 1975). Though 
there are certainly drastic differences between the types of plans being 
discussed in 1965 and PPACA, much of the literature sees the apparent decline 
in support for federally run health programs as an indication of distrust in the 
government.  One author puts forward that “If Medicare was being debated 
today would it be getting the same frosty reception that we are seeing now? To 
my mind, the answer is yes. Much of the opposition to healthcare reform today 
is being fueled by anti-government sentiment that did not exist during the 
mid-1960s” (Kohut 2009).   In light of the finding that opposition to PPACA 
appears to represent a sense of general outrage toward the way the country’s 
issues are being handled by the government, it appears that such arguments 







Figure 4: “Unfavorable Views of Law May Be Proxy For General 
Feelings About Washington” (Brodie 2011) 
 
 
V. A Partisan Proxy and the History of Mass Opinion of 
Reform  
 
In both the cases of the HSA and PPACA we have seen a divide of mass 
opinion on party lines.  Yet when we look at public opinion polls on health care 
from the past 1940s-1970s, we see far lower levels of opposition to federal 
government financing of healthcare (see Appendix).  At the same time these 
polls were asked though, the net total of Republicans and Democrats in the 
population was very similar to the net total of Republicans and Democrats today.  
With this in mind it does not appear that there were simply fewer Republicans in 
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the past, but instead hints that the strong relationship between partisanship and 
belief on the structure of health policy is a feature of modern American politics.   
Using public opinion data collected from years 1945 through 1974 by 
Harris, Harris for Life, Gallup, ORC, or SRC-M (The Polls: Health Insurance 
(Erskine 1975) I subtract the proportion of people in opposition to the federally 
run health reform/program from the proportion of people in support of the 
federally run health reform/program and find that on average 24.6% 
(median=25.5%) more Americans were in support of federally run health 
reforms/programs than were in opposition to it. 
In looking at current public opinion data surrounding PPACA and then at 
public opinion data from the 1940s-1970s it is also notable that the relative 
gain of support among opposition to PPACA is equal to the margin between 
those in the 1940s-1970s who replied in opposition and those who replied that 
they did not have enough information to state an opinion.  In other words, the 
approximate sum of people responding that they had too little knowledge in the 
1940s-1970s plus the number of people in opposition to healthcare reform in 
this same era equals (approximately) the overall opposition to PPACA today.   
Using the Kaiser public opinion data, ranging from April 2010-Present I find 
that the average percentage of opposition to PPACA is 43.09%.  Using the 
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collection of public opinion data from 1940-1970 I find that the average sum of 
“Too little information” and “Oppose” categories=43.47%.  Obviously such 
an empirical observation is riddled with problems of sample homogeneity and 
ecological inference.  However, this fact is at least suggestive that a shift has 
occurred among the American public, given the great decrease in the number of 
individuals undecided on their policy preference, and a great increase in the 
number of individuals now in opposition to federal health reform efforts.  






—Chapter 4: The Foundation for Running the 
Regression— 
 
Using data provided by the American National Election Survey (ANES) 
from the EGSS I, II, and III surveys4 this section investigates the state of public 
opinion on PPACA among Americans living at or below 133% FPL.  The data for 
EGSS I were collected October 8-19, 2010; the data for EGSS II were 
collected from May 11-June 1, 2010; the data for EGSS III were collected 
from December 7 to 13, 2011.  
Within these data, respondents who lived at or below133% FPL were 
separated from the general population and the variable defining the respondent’s 
stance on PPACA was observed.  Before this study asks what factors may be 
responsible for opposition to PPACA among those living at or below 133% FPL, 
it must first establish that there is in fact opposition among this population.   
                                                
4 The ANES 2010-2012 Evaluations of Government and Society Study (EGSS) is a series of 
surveys that will be conducted over the Internet in 2010-2012 using samples representative of the 
national population of adult citizens. Each survey will have a separate sample; this is not a panel 
study. The chief aims of the surveys are to measure public opinion in advance of the 2012 
election and to pilot-test new instrumentation. Survey questions for the EGSS mainly come from 




Given the decision to study all individuals at or below 133% FPL, it is 
important to also acknowledge that not every respondent in this subpopulation 
will be obtaining health insurance for the first time.  Many of these individuals 
living at or below 100% FPL may have already been eligible for Medicaid 
coverage via federal or state funding.  Although this is a vital note, the number 
of individuals in the study population who were actually covered by Medicaid or 
Medicaid-like programs is likely to be extremely low. As Flowers (2010) 
notes: “Prior to the enactment of PPACA, certain adults (non-elderly adults 
who are not disabled, not pregnant, or not parents of dependent children) were 
generally not eligible for federally financed Medicaid benefits no matter how 
poor they were.”  
Even though state Medicaid-like programs covered many of these 
ineligible individuals, this was not in the majority of cases. She additionally points 
out that “Fewer than half of the states currently provide Medicaid to low-
income childless adults, and their levels of coverage range from being 
comparable to the Medicaid benefit package to far less comprehensive 
coverage”  (Flowers 2010).  In light of this fact, the expansion of Medicaid via 
PPACA to cover all individuals at or below 133% FPL should result in the initial 
receipt, or expansion, of coverage for the vast majority of this subpopulation. 
Even for those who had some form of health insurance prior to the passage of 
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PPACA, their new eligibility under PPACA promises a greater breadth of 
coverage and services than what they had before.  Additionally, “Health care 
reform [PPACA] made lifetime limits illegal”, which is a major change for any 
individual living at or below this income level with, or who has a family member 
with, a chronic illness (Cohen 2012).  With all of this said, it appears reasonable 
to study all individuals at or below 133% FPL. 
Figure 6 includes three histograms depicting the frequency of opposition 
to PPACA amongst respondents from EGSS I, EGSS, II, and EGSS III (top to 
bottom).  The question format in the EGSS I survey involved only two 
responses: Support or Oppose.  For EGSS II and EGSS III, the question format 
included three responses: Support, Oppose, or Neither.   
Although the public opinion analysis included in the above section of this 
thesis shows an increased propensity of support for PPACA amongst the 
uninsured and American poor, it also reveals an intense partisan gap in opinions 
over the healthcare reform bill.  Knowing that at least some proportion of the 
population under 133% FPL are Republican, it is therefore likely that some 
number of them will be in opposition to the bill despite it being beneficial to 
their health and arguably in their objective interest.  An assessment of this sub-
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population across the EGSS I, EGSS II, and EGSS III ANES study populations 
reveals a somewhat surprising feature of public opinion on PPACA.   
As aforementioned, the bill was designed and instituted largely with the 
ambition of providing health security and assistance to the American poor. As 
such, one would expect that the recipients of this assistance would be in 
support of the bill.  However, an analysis of this population reveals that this is 
not entirely the case.  In the EGSS I data, which happens to have been collected 
closer in time to the passage of the bill, the level of support amongst this 
subpopulation exceeds the level of opposition; yet in the following two surveys, 
the opposite is true.  Such a finding is incredibly surprising, in that the bill was 
designed largely in the name of benefiting this population.  If they oppose it, 
what does this mean?  More so, the increasing propensity to oppose the PPACA 
over the course of EGSS I to EGSS III makes it plausible that other factors such 
as may partisan proxies, may be responsible for shifts in PPACA opinion, 
especially given the increased fervor of the rhetoric surrounding the Republican 






























Why is the finding that Americans living at or below 133% FPL are 
opposing PPACA against their objective interest so surprising?  Given the fact 
that by opposing PPACA these individuals are opposing something that has been 
shown in the past to improve self-reported health outcomes and financial 
security, it appears that this sub-population is being motivated not by a concern 
about their own physiological or safety needs, but instead by something else.  
As the psychologist Abraham Maslow (1943) argues when discussing his theory 






“If the physiological needs are relatively well gratified there then 
emerges a new set of needs, which we may categorize roughly as the safety 
needs.  All that has been said of the physiological needs is equally true, though 
in lesser degree of these desires. The organism may equally well be wholly 
dominated by them.  They may serve as the almost exclusive organizers of 
behavior, recruiting all the capacities of the organism in their service, and we 
may then fairly describe the whole organism as a safety-seeking mechanism.” 
 
 
Figure 7 represents a visualization of Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy.  The 
bottom of the pyramid represents the most fundamental motivators of human 
action, while the top represents lesser motivators of human action. 
Figure 7: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
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As we can see from Figure 7 and Maslow’s commentary, concern about 
one’s health and safety should be a greater motivator of human action than 
concerns about belonging, identity, or self-actualization. Although we now know 
that some individuals below 133% FPL are opposing PPACA, and this appears to 
run counter to their self-interest, we do not yet know what drives this 
decision.  If the hypothesis of this paper is correct—that issues of partisan 
identity and other ideological concerns are trumping those of improved health 
outcomes—this would flow against the hierarchy of Maslow’s theory.  Another 
possibility exists though, wherein individuals see PPACA as a sincere threat to 
their safety or physiological needs.  However, if this is indeed the case, the 
variable capturing concern about paying for healthcare bills should increase 









—Chapter 5: Definition of model & Variables— 
Given the above findings—that many individuals living at or below 133% FPL 
are opposing PPACA even though it expands a Medicaid program shown to 
improve health outcomes—it appears that these potential improved health 
outcomes do not serve as the primary motivation of public opinion of the health 
reform for many.   This chapter examines what characteristics and beliefs 
appear to drive opinion on healthcare reform.  Using a binary logistic regression 
model, this analysis uses the ANES EGSS I survey as a source for the 
explanatory variables outlined below and for the binary response variable of 
opposing or supporting PPACA.  Although this paper would like to assess the 
accuracy of this model for EGSS I, EGSS II, and EGSS III surveys, the EGSS II 
and EGSS III lack questions addressing the issue of a respondent’s anxiety 
about paying for healthcare.  As an essential point of comparison in the model 
proposed below, I thus limit this analysis to the EGSS I data set.   
The primary model that will be tested in this study is as follows: 
x1= Party Identification 
x2= Ideological Concerns about Federal Government 
x3= Anxiety about Paying for Healthcare 
X4 = Political Sophistication Value 
 
Y= logistic (B0 + B1x1 + B2x2 + B3x3 + B4x4) 
Y=1 when person opposes PPACA 
Y=0 when person supports PPACA 
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I. X1: Partisan Identification: 
 In light of evidence from both the Kaiser Public Opinion Polls (Brodie 
2010, 2011) and the literature (Cutler and Gruber 2001) on the Clinton Health 
Security Act, and likewise with the intuitions guided by literature on political 
party identification (Campbell et al. 1960, Green, Palmquist and Schiclker 2002, 
Groenendyck 2009), this study hypothesizes that partisanship is a key driver of 
public opinion on PPACA.  Thus, the model that I created to be predictive of 
opposition to PPACA will use political party as an explanatory variable.  At this 
point, given the consistent correlation between political party and opinion of 
healthcare, it would seem unsurprising to find that party affiliation drives opinion 
of PPACA in the general population.  However, within the context of the 
subpopulation being studied here (Americans at or below 133% FPL), such a 
finding would show that despite potential for health improvement, Party ID 
causes some to oppose it, controlling for other factors.  
 As posited by this paper, for Americans at or below 133% FPL, the 
expansion of federally funded Medicaid via PPACA is in their objective interest.  
More so, the fact that improved self-reported health outcomes are associated 
with the uptake of Medicaid insurance (see Baicker et al. 2011), thus indicating 
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that Medicaid insurance benefits either the “physiological” or “safety” level 
of human need, shows that the choice to oppose PPACA appears to run counter 
to Maslow’s (1943) theory of human motivation.   Therefore, the finding that 
political party still drives opinion of PPACA among this sub-population would be 
notable in the sense that it appears to go against traditional psychological 
thought on human motivation.   
Operationalization:  
While there have been numerous studies discussing which measures of 
partisanship are the most useful, this study attempts to simplify any discords in 
that discussion by calculating for the variable of partisanship using data based 
directly on self-identification of partisanship. It is certainly a strong measure of 
an individual’s Party ID if that person self-identifies as a Republican or 
Democrat. In the ANES EGSS I survey, the question asks: “Generally speaking, 
do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or 
what?”  Using the answers to this question, the study created “Dummy” 
variables for being a Republican and being a Democrat.  For the creation of the 
“Republican Party ID” variable, a value of 2, which translates to Republican, 
was coded to equal 1, and all other answers were coded to equal 0.   The same 
was true for the “Democrat Party ID” variable, although this was not used in 
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the regression, as Democrats were more likely to support the bill, an act we 
would expect amongst the subpopulation of Americans living at or below 133% 
FPL. 
II. X2: Ideological Concerns about Federal Government: 
Evidence from the Kaiser Public Opinion data suggests ideological 
concerns about government may also be a proxy for PPACA opinion  (See 
Figure 4).  While there are a variety of questions in the ANES EGSS I data that 
capture ideology, this study first uses the question about trusting the 
government in Washington D.C.  Though a question addressing trust in 
government may not be what traditional literature would use to represent 
ideology, there is no doubt that a growing proportion of the American population 
has a negative view of the federal government.  
While the aforementioned literature regarding correlations of policy 
preference and ideological concerns suggests that American ideology is 
relatively unstable, and thus not predictive of issue preference, it appears, at 
least within the confines of opinion of healthcare and other social policy, that 
modern American definitions of partisanship have found their fault line around 
tenth amendment issues and the tensions of federalism  (See Leonard 2011). 
Certainly, concerns about gun-control, taxes, or abortion predominate thought 
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about ideological affiliation; however, especially given the federalism rhetoric 
attached to PPACA, an individual’s belief about proper size of government is 
likely a crucial motivator of opinion of PPACA. 
In the same way that political party identification appears to be a proxy 
for public opinion of PPACA, general sentiment about the state of the country 
appears predictive of opinion on healthcare reform.  Thus, the primary model of 
this study aimed to capture survey responses that portrayed either a general 
ideological dissatisfaction with the government, or a general ideological belief 
about the potential of upward social mobility.  
Operationalization: 
 For the primary model the variable of “Distrust in Washington D.C.” 
was created as a representation of low trust in the federal government.  The 
ANES EGSS I asks the question “How much of the time do you think you can 
trust the federal government in Washington DC to do what is right—just about 
always, most of the time, or only some of the time?”  Answers of just about 
always and most of the time, were coded to equal 0, and an answer of only 
some of the time was coded to equal 1.  In this way a positive value for this 
variable represents a decreased trust in the federal government, at least in 
relation to the rest of the population. 
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Other variables that aimed to capture ideological beliefs on the federal 
government were tested in Model Two and Model Three. In Model Two the 
ideological concern being tested was a belief about progressive taxation.  The 
reason this variable was included was not because belief about taxes has been a 
traditional ideological fault line, but rather to see if a belief about an issue so 
relevant to the question of whether the government should be redistributing 
wealth, or should instead be “keeping their hands off”, had any effect on 
PPACA opinion. This variable titled “Opposition to Increased Taxation on > 
$250,000” was calculated from the ANES EGSS I question that asked “Do 
you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose federal income taxes for people 
who make more than $250,000 per year?” (ANES EGSS1 2010).  Keeping in 
mind that this study addresses the subpopulation of Americans living at or below 
133% FPL, this question certainly captures ideological beliefs rather than a 
concern about having to pay more taxes. 
For Model Three the variable of outrage was created from the ANES EGSS I 
question that asked: “How outraged, generally speaking, do you feel about the 
way things are going in the country these days?”  These answers were 
recoded so that a value of 1, or extremely outraged, equaled 5, a higher value, 
and those of 5, or not at all outraged, equaled 1.  Thus a high value here 
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represented a higher level of outrage with the way things are going in the 
country. 
III. X3: Anxiety about Paying Healthcare Bills 
The inclusion of the variable “concern about paying for healthcare” is 
derived from the practical assumption that if someone is extremely worried 
about paying for healthcare bills that they would be more inclined to support a 
health reform that will provide them fully federally funded Medicaid coverage. 
While such an argument seems innate, Kaiser public opinion data provides 
additional support for these claims.  People with preexisting conditions are more 
likely to worry about paying for healthcare and also believe they are most likely 
to benefit from the bill (see Figure 8 and Figure 9). While this variable will shed 
light on whether such individuals really believe that PPACA will fulfill their 
needs, it also serves as an essential point of comparison when evaluating the 
magnitude that each factor has on predicting opposition to PPACA.  
Operationalization:  
The variable of concern about paying for healthcare was created from the 
ANES EGSS I question that asked “How worried are you about not being able 
to pay for healthcare during the next 12 months?” (ANES EGSS1 2010).     
Because this study wants to evaluate whether being concerned about paying for 
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healthcare has any effect on a respondent’s stance on PPACA, the variable was 
recoded so that answers of 5, or not at all worried, were coded to equal 0, and 
answers of 1, or extremely worried, were coded to equal 1.  Thus a higher 
value for this variable represents an increased anxiety about paying for 
healthcare costs over the next 12 months. 
 
Figure 8: People With Pre-Existing Conditions More Likely to 


























Figure 9: Uninsured, Low-income, and People With Pre-Existing 












IV. X4: Value of Political Sophistication 
The inclusion of the value of political sophistication stems firstly from the 
Kaiser public opinion data (Brodie 2010, 2011), which reveals that those who 
have the most unfavorable views of PPACA appear to have the lowest amount 
of information about what the law entails.  Opposition to PPACA, against the 
respondent’s objective interest, may result largely from the fact that the 
respondent does not recognize what the reform will do to benefit them.  In 
looking at the results from Kaiser’s “pop quiz” on the reform (See Appendix & 
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Figure 10), we can see some intriguing, and vastly divergent, patterns of the 
relationship between knowledge about the bill and favorability.  The Kaiser data 
groups individuals’ knowledge of the law by ranges of scores, with high scores 
representing strong and detailed knowledge about the reform, moderate scores 
with some knowledge of the reform, and low scores with little to no 
understanding of the reform. 
Looking at Figure 10, only 16% of those with unfavorable views of the 
healthcare reform were high scorers, 42% were moderate scorers, and 42% 
were low scorers. Conversely, of those with favorable views of the healthcare 
reform, 38% were high scorers, 40% moderate scorers, and 23% were low 
scorers.  Additionally, for those who said the health reform would make them 
worse off, 17% were high scorers, 42% were moderate scorers, and 42% were 
low scorers, while for those who said health reform would make them better 
off, 38% were high scorers, 39% were moderate scorers, and 23% were low 
scorers.  
 This supports the claim that the less an individual knows about healthcare 
reform, the more likely he or she is to oppose it, or that the more an individual 
knows about the healthcare reform, the more likely he or she is to support it.  It 
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also may be that unfavorable views of the bill are driven by a lack of familiarity 
or a lack of dissemination of information about the reform.  
Interestingly, though not surprising in the sense that Republicans are 
known to have a much more pronounced opposition to PPACA, the correlation 
between knowledge and favorability of the law is apparently mimicked by the 
correlation between knowledge about the law and partisan identity. Looking at 
Figure 10 again, we see that on one hand, only 18% of Republicans were high 
scorers, 43% were middle scorers, and 39% were low scorers, while 32% of 
Democrats were high scorers, 36% moderate scorers, and 32% low scorers.  
The number of individuals who were high scorers and identified themselves as 
Democrats is almost double the number of individuals that were high scorers and 
identified themselves as Republicans. 
Such data suggests that 1) having little information about PPACA has a 
positive correlation with an opposition to the PPACA, and 2) that there is a 
correlation between low information on PPACA and identifying as a Republican.  
It has been suggested throughout this paper that both an adherence to partisan 
identity and motivated partisanship drive opposition to PPACA.  It is thus also 
possible that this adherence to an individual-level identity translates into the 
use of partisan proxies to supplement a lack of information on the policy.  If in 
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the regression we find that low access to information positively correlates with 
opposition to PPACA, this would suggest the validity of a proxy model of policy 
preference, one which I will discuss in more detail later (see Lupia 1994).   
Figure 10: Results of Kaiser’s Pop-Quiz on PPACA 
 High Scorer Moderate Scorer Low Scorer 
Favorable View 38% 40% 23% 
Unfavorable View 16% 42% 42% 
Health Reform will make 
me Better off 
38% 39% 23% 
Health Reform will Make 
me Worse off 
17% 42% 42% 
Republican 18% 43% 39% 










There were a number of methods to evaluate the political sophistication of 
a respondent.  While ideally this study would have liked to include the responses 
to Kaiser’s pop quiz questions about PPACA as the determinant of this value, 
such questions were not asked or mimicked in the ANES EGSS I survey.  
Another measure of political competence or sophistication that is commonly 
used is the assessment of the ideological discord of responses to survey 
questions.  Such measures calculate the number of times an individual expresses 
responses of traditional conservatism with those of traditional liberalism, and 
then assesses how much variation there is between those responses.  While this 
may have yielded some interesting findings, this study is much more interested 
in how much information the respondent may or may not have about PPACA.  
Thus, while discord of ideology in responses may capture something about 
political sophistication, we are much more interested in the element of political 
competence that is embodied by the amount of political information a 
respondent seeks out.   
For this variable the study used questions from the ANES EGSS1 survey, 
which measured the frequency that an individual accesses political information 
from various media sources.  ANES EGSS1 questions pp046-pp051 ask: “How 
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often do you get information about politics from [Radio, Internet News Sites, 
Paper Newspapers, Television, Magazines, Internet Blogs]?” Each question was 
coded so that a value of 6, or Never, equaled 1 and other values equaled 0 
(ANES EGSS1 2010).   The total of these questions for each respondent was 
then calculated so that those respondents with the most answers of “never” 
had the highest values for this variable.  Thus, a high value for information 













—Chapter 6. Results— 
Running the model described above in SPSS, I carried out a binary logistic 
regression.  As previously mentioned, the binary response variable reflected the 
respondent’s opinion of PPACA.  This PPACA variable was coded so that 
1=opposition to PPACA and 0=support for PPACA.5  The results of this 
regression are depicted in Table 1. 
I. Primary Model(s) 
First, looking at the variable titled ‘Distrust in Washington D.C.’, we find 
an Exp(B) of 2.192 with a high level of significance (p=.029). Given that we 
coded this variable so that those who have little or no trust in DC have higher 
values for this variable, the finding of a statistically significant value of 2.192 
means that those who have low trust in the federal government are about 2 
times more likely to oppose PPACA.  A similar effect is visible in the variable 
titled ‘Republican Party ID.’ Coding the variable so that 1=Republican and 0= 
anything else, the statistically significant value of 3.753 shows that those below 
133%FPL who are Republican are about 3.7 times more likely to oppose PPACA 
when controlling for other factors.  Looking at the variable ‘Concern About 
                                                
5 In the ANES EGSSI survey there was no option of undecided or no preference.  Thus in my 
model we drop this from consideration. 
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Paying for Healthcare’, which represents an individual’s concern about paying for 
healthcare costs in the upcoming year, there is a somewhat intriguing 
relationship.  
The p value for ‘Concern About Paying for Healthcare” is .118 and 
thus, these results are not necessarily statistically significant when using a 
confidence level of 5%.  This result is indicative of the fact that the variable has 
little explanatory effect on the response variable of opinion of PPACA. If we do 
accept this value as significant, it decreases opposition to PPACA as we would 
expect. 






Variable: Opposition to 
PPACA B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Distrust in 
Washington D.C. 
.785 .359 4.791 1 .029 2.192 




-.163 .104 2.449 1 .118 .850 
Lack of Access to 
Political Information 
.139 .077 3.253 1 .071 1.149 
Step 1a 
Constant -1.223 .476 6.606 1 .010 .294 




As has been hypothesized and discussed throughout this paper, partisan 
affiliation is a crucial motivator of a respondent’s opinion on PPACA, regardless 
of the fact that the bill is in their objective interest.  As in Model One, even 
when we replace the variable of  ‘distrust in Washington D.C.’ from Table 1 
with a variable representing opinion about the ideological battleground that is 
progressive tax policy in Table 2, the influential effect of party affiliation is still 
evident.  Similarly to the impact that political affiliation had in Table 1 with an 
Exp(B) value of 3.753, being a Republican in Model Two, with an Exp(B) value 
of  (Table 2) 3.887, makes a respondent about 4 times more likely to voice 
opposition to PPACA.   
Using the different variable in Model Two has about no effect on this 
value, showing that my model is robust. While in Model Two the statistical 
significance of the ‘Lack of Access to Political Information’ or competence 
variable is not at a level where one could make entirely definitive assumptions, it 
does appear that low access to political information increases the propensity of 






Table 2: Primary Model (Ideological Concern: Opposition to 
Progressive Taxation) 
 
N=241 Dependent Variable: 
Opposition to PPACA B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Republican Party ID 1.358 .431 9.904 1 .002 3.887 
Concern About Paying 
for Healthcare 
-.105 .133 .620 1 .431 .901 
Lack of Access to 
Political Information 
.100 .104 .928 1 .335 1.105 
Opposition to 
Increased Taxation on 
> $250,000 
2.309 .514 20.165 1 .000 10.067 
Step 1a 




Table 3 includes the results of the Model Three.  The only difference 
between this model and the primary model outlined in this paper is the use of 
‘outrage with the way the country is going’ as the explanatory variable 
capturing an “ideological concern.”  Using this variable as a replacement for 
“Distrust in Washington D.C.”, barely changes the results of the regression.  
This suggests the strength of my model as a predictive measure of opinion on 
PPACA.  Here, in an additive fashion with the other explanatory variables, 
“outrage with the way the country is going” makes a respondent about 1.3 




times more likely to oppose PPACA, while the values of the variables from 
before remained stable. 
Table 3: Primary Model (Ideological Concern: Outrage with the way 
Things are Going) 
 
N=241 Dependent Variable: 
Opposition to PPACA B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Concern About Paying 
for Healthcare 
-.157 .105 2.267 1 .132 .854 
Republican Party ID 1.273 .317 16.154 1 .000 3.572 
Lack of Access to 
Political Information 
.131 .077 2.877 1 .090 1.140 
Outrage with the way 
the country is going 
.268 .116 5.374 1 .020 1.307 
Step 1a 




II. Interaction Effects 
 
In Tables 1, 2, and 3, the statistical significance of the variable ‘Concern 
About Paying for Healthcare” was low.  However, in Table 1 and 3, with an 
alpha level of 14 (86% confidence), we can argue that this variable is indeed 
having an effect.  Excluding the value of ‘Concern About Paying for 
Healthcare” produced in Table 2, it appears that the more anxious a respondent 
is about paying for healthcare bills, the less likely they are to oppose PPACA.  




Such a finding is unsurprising; in fact, it is what one would expect.  Given that 
PPACA expands Medicaid coverage to the individuals addressed in this analysis, 
and thus will likely ease the burden of paying for healthcare costs, the 
decreased propensity of a respondent to oppose PPACA is entirely sensible.  
Though overall concern about paying healthcare bills is either a weak predictor 
of PPACA opinion, or lessens the propensity to oppose PPACA, when I 
interacted this variable with the variable ‘Republican Party ID’, I observed that 
the issue of concern about paying for healthcare (something which should drive 
healthcare opinion) is in fact a less important factor than is partisan affiliation. 
 Being a Republican makes an individual about 16.5 times more likely to 
oppose healthcare reform, while being concerned about paying for healthcare 
bills has no statistically significant effect.  Thus, normally, opinion of PPACA for 
Republicans is motivated largely by partisanship.  However, when a Republican 
partisan has concerns about paying for healthcare this lessens their propensity 
to oppose the bill as is visible from an Exp(B) value of .647.   
Though this finding may refute the notion that partisan identification is 
the strict determinant of opinion of PPACA, such an argument does not hold 
much validity when we evaluate the magnitude by which this concern decreases 
an individual’s propensity to oppose.  While being concerned about paying for 
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healthcare bills decreases the likelihood for Republicans to oppose, it does not 
scale back opposition to PPACA in a magnitude that comes close to the 
magnitude that being a Republican increases opposition.  Such findings support 
the point that in this model ‘party ID’ is a more crucial determinant of PPACA 
than ‘concern about paying for healthcare.’ 
 
Table 4: Interaction Effect of Republican Partisan Affiliation Dummy & 
Anxiety about  
Paying for Healthcare Bills Dummy 
 
N=241 Dependent Variable: 
Opposition to PPACA B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Republican Party ID 2.724 .872 9.756 1 .002 15.244 
Concern About Paying 
for Healthcare 
-.041 .124 .107 1 .744 .960 
Lack of Access to 
Political Information 
.153 .078 3.872 1 .049 1.165 
Distrust in Washington 
D.C. 
.737 .362 4.135 1 .042 2.089 
Republican Party ID X 
Concern About Paying 
for Healthcare 
-.423 .240 3.114 1 .078 .655 
Step 1a 









III. Other Factors: 
I have shown above that partisanship, levels of political sophistication, and 
ideological concerns about government size and function affect the propensity of 
an individual to oppose PPACA, while concern about paying for healthcare bills 
does not appear to have any effect, or only a small negative effect, on this 
opinion.  These findings certainly lend support to the hypothesis laid out in this 
thesis. Additionally though, there are a number of other issues that I found 
contribute to opinion of PPACA. 
One of these other factors, attitudes toward giving extra benefits to 
African Americans, was characterized as a racial attitude and tested as an 
explanatory variable of opinion on PPACA.  Recently, in the context of 
President Obama’s time in office, much has been written on the “racialization” 








As (Tesler 2010) points out 
“Obama appears to be driving the policy preferences of blacks and whites 
farther apart.  With over 80 percent of African-Americans consistently 
supporting Obama’s healthcare reform plan, the 2009-2010 racial divide in 
healthcare opinions was roughly 20 percentage points larger than it  was for 
President Clinton’s healthcare plan back in 1993-1994 Obama’s healthcare 
reform proposals was regularly debated during the summer and fall of 2009. 
Several experiments provide even stronger evidence that political messages can 
link racial groups with public policies.  These studies convincingly demonstrate 
that race cues as subtle as coded words (i.e. “inner city”), black imagery, and 
especially some combination of the two often make racial attitudes a more 
central determinant of political preferences (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino et al. 
2002; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; White 2007; Winter 2008).  Or, as Hurwitz 
and Peffley (2005,109) conclude, “When messages are framed in such a way 
to reinforce the relationship between a particular policy and a particular group, it 
becomes far more likely that individuals will evaluate the policy on the basis of 
their evaluations of the group.” 
 
Such claims appear validated by my results.  Those who believe that 
African Americans should receive no extra help from the federal government, 
and that they start with the same advantages of white Americans, are about 2 
times more likely to voice an opposition to PPACA, if we accept these results as 
significant with a p value of .106.  Framing PPACA by this racial divide appears 






Table 5: Attitudes Toward “Extra Help” for Blacks 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 




.012 .138 .008 1 .928 1.012 
Lack of Access to 
Political Information 
.061 .116 .277 1 .599 1.063 
Distrust in 
Washington D.C. 
.958 .562 2.908 1 .088 2.607 
Belief that Blacks 
Should Receive no 
Addnl. Assistance 
.779 .482 2.610 1 .106 2.179 
Step 1a 






Another factor worthy of consideration is the status of the respondent’s 
state in the lawsuit against PPACA.  One may expect, especially in light of the 
publicity that such lawsuits have gained with the Supreme Court accepting a writ 
of certiorari, that an individual’s opinion of PPACA may be governed by whether 
or not their state is a plaintiff in the case against PPACA.  However, if we look 
at Table 6 it appears that the question of whether or not a respondent’s state is 
in the lawsuit has no statistically significant effect on the question of PPACA 
opinion.  With a p value of .923, the Exp(B) is not a useful predictor of PPACA 




opinion.  Even if we were to accept such a low confidence level as significant, 
the influence of a respondent’s state being in the lawsuit has an effect in the 
opposite direction than we would expect. 
Table 6: Impact of Respondent’s State being in Lawsuit  
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Status of Respondent’s 
State in Lawsuit 
Against PPACA 
-.027 .283 .009 1 .923 .973 
Republican Party ID 1.322 .313 17.847 1 .000 3.752 
Concern about Paying 
for Healthcare 
-.163 .104 2.453 1 .117 .849 
Distrust in Washington 
D.C. 
.785 .359 4.793 1 .029 2.193 
Lack of Access to 
Political Information 
.139 .077 3.258 1 .071 1.149 
Step 1a 











—Chapter 7. Discussion of Results— 
Looking at the results of my regression in the context of Maslow’s 
traditional hierarchy of needs, it is illogical that an issue of objective health 
interest would not be the primary motivator of human action.  In this discussion, 
I argue why these results are not so surprising.  In the context of existing 
literature on American electoral behavior and partisan motivated reasoning, I 
evaluate whether the stability and influence of party ID, when coupled minimal 
political information, enhances the use of partisan or party elite proxies. I posit 
that this may explain why individuals living at or below 133% FPL are 
expressing an opinion against PPACA despite it being in their self-interest.  
I argue that the stability of individual level party ID determines the proxy 
by which choosers govern their policy preference in the absence of political 
information.  The results of my regression lend support to this hypothesis, 
showing that a Republican party ID greatly increases the probability that an 
individual opposes PPACA when controlling for other factors, including low 
political information, ideological concerns about government, and concern about 
paying for healthcare. 
It is well noted that political party affiliation has become more than just an 
association for many Americans.  In many ways it is a predominant feature of 
identity rooted in self-conceptualization (Monroe et al. 2000).  This distinction 
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between conceptualizing partisanship as an identity rather than solely an attitude 
has been a crucial element of political science literature (see Campbell et al. 
1960).  In the seminal work, The American Voter, suggesting that American 
partisanship is not a flexible affiliation but rather an element of core identity, 
Campbell et al. (1960), states: 
“American voters frequently see themselves as belonging to partisan 
groups, Democrats or Republicans. The group in effect is suspended by the 
psychological image it conjures. It exists as a stereotype in the minds of voters, 
who in turn harbor a sense of attachment toward this group image. Democrats, 
for example, are people who think of themselves as Democrats.  This solves the 
puzzle of how a public that is traditionally skeptical of parties, has little 
information about their activities, and virtually no contact with them as 
organizations could identify themselves as partisans. The conceptual focus is not 
on identification with the parties per se but with Democrats and Republicans as 
social groups.” 
 
Such an argument appears especially salient in the context of my results.  
Though it is possible that opinion of PPACA is simply a reflection of true 
preference, one that happens to be divided on partisan lines, the effect that we 
observe between partisanship and stance on PPACA suggests that partisanship is 
driving policy preference rather than policy preference driving party ID.  Party 
ID appears to serve as the lens through which respondents are viewing the 
political world.  Adding to this work, more recent literature such as “Partisan 
Hearts and Partisan Minds” by Green, Palmquist and Schiclker (2002) 
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maintains that party identification at an individual level is stable and pronounced.  
The authors offer detailed support for their conclusions from the ANES. 
Together, this literature helps us evaluate what is going on in the context 
of my study.  Certainly the argument could be made that the individuals 
examined here are simply 1) Republican partisans and 2) have a sincere 
ideological dissatisfaction with federal involvement in health policy; the latter of 
these being the primary motivation for opposition to PPACA.   However, in light 
of the argument that the majority of Americans   have little true ideological 
consistency (Campbell et al. 1960 and Converse 1964), it is doubtful that 
opposition to PPACA would be consistent across even a period of months.  Such 
inconsistency in mass opinion of PPACA is visible in Figure 6 shown above.  
 Given the facts that 1) partisanship and opinion of PPACA are so 
inexorably linked and that 2) low access to political information also drives 
opposition to PPACA, it is more likely that a respondent’s opinion of PPACA is 
neither a random answer nor a sincere belief, but instead one that is governed 
by the work done by Popkin (1994) and Lupia (1994, 2006). While this 
literature is focused on the act of voting, the motivations of a vote and an 
expression of public opinion are likely analogous.   Thus I apply their work here 
to the expression of public opinion. 
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The question of whether a low level of political knowledge maintained by 
the American majority compromises the interpretation of public opinion as a 
sincere weighing of policy options and considerations has long been asked.  
Though much of the literature has confirmed Converse’s (1964) findings, 
including the more nuanced version of this work by Zaller(1992), the work on 
proxy-voting and signaling (Lupia 1994, Popkin 1994) asks a different 
question entirely: is it possible that, despite this lack of political information, the 
citizenry is still capable of casting votes that express their interests in the same 
way that they would with complete political knowledge?  In other words, as 
Lupia (1994) asks, “Is competence a necessary condition for voting?” 
Prior to Lupia’s work in California and his article, “How Elitism 
Undermines Studies of Voter Competence”, a spate of literature assessed how 
the electorate utilizes “information shortcuts”.  Most notable of this literature 
is Popkin 1991, which argues that individuals can use “information shortcuts” 
to make reasoned electoral choices in the absence of detailed knowledge about 
policies and platforms. Lupia’s research in 1994 continues this line of 
investigation, showing that voters in a California insurance referendum used the 
position of insurance companies as the proxy by which to formulate their own 
preferences regarding a complicated menu of alternative proposals (Bartels 
2008).  In“How Elitism Undermines the Study of Voter Competence” 
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(2006), Lupia elaborates on the use of proxies to supplement low political 
information by creating a diagram that depicts the relationship between the 
chooser, the proxy, and the choice. 
Lupia (2006) outlines the conditions under which proxies can serve as 
sufficient replacements for a lack of information.  In his figure, here titled 
Figure 11, he creates a mechanism to evaluate if the conditions for the use of 
proxies are met. There is no doubt that individuals in America with low political 
sophistication (which, according to Campbell et al. (1960) and Converse 
(1964), is the majority) use information shortcuts.  Often, these shortcuts do 
indeed allow for one to make the same decision that he would have made if he 











Figure 11: “Learning From Proxies” from Lupia (2006) 
 
 
However, additional research has suggested that while there are highly 
effective substitutes for a lack of political understanding, they are not always 
sufficient shortcuts.  As Bartels (1996) has shown, uninformed voters in six 
presidential elections voted “significantly better than they would by chance, 
but significantly less well than they would with complete information, despite 
the availability of cues and shortcuts” (Bartels 1996, 217).  
 Taking this observation into consideration, and applying Lupia’s figure to the 
situation of PPACA, it appears that party proxies, in this case, are not sufficient 
supplements for a lack of information about PPACA.  Because an informed 
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respondent in this subpopulation would know that PPACA is in the objective 
interest of one’s health and wellbeing, one would expect that they would 
support PPACA. However, in the absence of knowledge about PPACA, when 
respondents rely on partisan cues to determine their preference, it appears that 
such proxies serve as insufficient replacements for low political information.  
This relationship is clarified in Figure 12.  
Figure 12: “Learning From Proxies: Applied to the Case of PPACA”  
 
The results of my regression show that both Republican Party ID and low 
information motivates opposition to PPACA, thus suggesting that the use of 
partisan proxies to determine opinion of healthcare reform is a likely explanation 
for the evident trends. I argue that other ideological concerns included in this 
model—distrust in the federal government, outrage with the way things are 
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going, and beliefs about progressive taxation—serve as points of familiarity 
between choosers and proxies.  With respect to Figure 11, it seems that the 
emphasis put on the rhetoric of federalism, socialism, and big government by 
partisan proxies strengthens the familiarity between proxy and chooser.  Thus, 
the likelihood that an individual will rely on this proxy in the absence of specific 
information on PPACA is increased.   In the context of Zaller’s (1992) 
arguments, this may suggest that such aforementioned concerns, which are 
stressed when policies are viewed through a partisan lens, are the “primary 
considerations” that influence preference. In other words, it appears that the 
selection of proxies is mediated by partisan-based motivated reasoning.  As 
Kunda (1990) argues: “There is considerable evidence that people are more 
likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do 
so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications 
for these conclusions.”  By analyzing the results of my regression, I would 
argue that the ideological concerns we see associated with opposition to PPACA 
serve as the justification necessary for maintaining this preference. 
In the context of my study it appears that Campbell’s (1960), Converse’s 
(1964), Lupia’s (1994), and Zaller’s (1992) theories can coexist.  While we 
cannot speculate on the stability of partisanship from this study, it does appear 
that party ID is a crucial determinant of opinion of PPACA.   Given that party ID 
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is a core motivator of PPACA preference when controlling for other factors, and 
given that Campbell et al., Converse, Lupia, and Zaller all argue that a majority 
of Americans have a very low level of political knowledge, it is also likely that 
PPACA preference is being determined not by a true evaluation of the pros and 
cons of the bill, but by other factors instead.  My results in this study lend 
support to this notion.  
I argue that because ideological concerns about government, party ID, and 
low political competence drive opposition to PPACA, it is likely that the use of 
information shortcuts is at play.  In this situation, the use of party ID and party 
elite proxies dominate the random sampling of the mind that Zaller (1992) puts 
forth in his RAS model of public opinion expression.  While the opposition to 
PPACA may be some combination of the outrage that people have with the 
federal government and a reliance on party elite proxies to supplement low 
information, the fact that a policy designed to improve the health and well-
being of this sub-population is being opposed on any of these grounds is 
remarkable.  Together these findings question future aims to establish health 
policy in the name of helping the poor, for this population, at least in many of 
the cases, appear to not want the government’s help.  These findings likewise 
suggest that a dissemination of information about the bill from the Obama 
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administration may be a key in recapturing public support for PPACA amongst 





















In this paper, I have shown that many individuals living at or below 133% 
FPL are opposing PPACA against their potential self-interest.  As previously 
stated, such a finding runs counter to the intuitions of Maslow’s (1943) theory 
of human motivation, yet they are not surprising if viewed in light of the 
literature on American electoral behavior. This paper has confirmed that party 
ID, ideological concerns about government, and low political sophistication, all 
motivate opposition to PPACA.  Additionally, I have found that a concern about 
paying for health care bills slightly decreases opposition, but not in the same 
magnitude that the aforementioned issues increase opposition.  
Such findings support the possibility that when individuals lack information 
about PPACA, they use proxies that are determined by party ID and mediated 
by ideological beliefs in order to guide their preference.  That is, in the case of 
PPACA, American partisanship serves as the point of relation by which proxies 
are determined when political knowledge or policy comprehension is low. I 
likewise posit that the ideological concerns that we observe to be increasing 
opposition to PPACA, serve as the justification for this proxy-use.  This feature 
of my model suggests that when individuals gather information on complex 
policies, they are encouraged by motivated partisan reasoning to focus on who 
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passed PPACA and how PPACA affects the size of government, rather than 
objectively evaluating the policy’s pros and cons. 
Despite the apparent strength of this argument on its own, it is important 
to note that there do exist alternative explanations for these results.  One such 
alternative may be that Medicaid expansion under PPACA does not begin until 
2014, and thus, this subpopulation has not yet experienced the advantages that 
the bill may bring.  Although such a point may answer the question of why 
individuals are in fact opposing PPACA, it does not explain the part of my 
regression results that portray influence of partisanship and ideology. Secondly, 
it is possible that these individuals merely believe that a growth of the federal 
government via PPACA is more threatening to their livelihood than the threat of 
not having health insurance.  While this paper cannot necessarily deny the 
possibility that these individuals hold such strong beliefs, I argue, in line with 
Converse’s (1964) prescriptions that most Americans show little ideological 
consistency, that these beliefs are primarily a result of motivated partisan 
reasoning and proxy use.   
With these caveats, it is vital that I note the implications of my 
conclusions.  Although opinion of PPACA, which appears to be founded on 
partisan proxies, may not directly compromise the mechanism of democracy, 
the frequent use of mass opinion in political decision-making and policymaking 
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reveals that there are indirect implications for the determination of individual 
policy preference by partisan proxy.  The most obvious of these implications is 
that a reliance on proxies that signal against an individual’s objective interest 
shifts the voice of policy preference away from the individual and into the hands 
of the ebbs and flows of party politics.  In other words, the trends of mass 
opinion may not truly represent the needs or interest of the citizenry, but 
instead a mere reiteration of party identity.  
In his farewell address to the Union, George Washington highlighted his 
thoughts regarding factionalism and political parties in American Democracy.  He 
stated:  
"The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the 
spirit of revenge natural to party dissention, which in different ages & countries 
has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But 
this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders & 
miseries, which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security & 
repose in the absolute power of an Individual: and sooner or later the chief of 
some prevailing faction more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns 
this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of Public 
Liberty." — George Washington, September 19, 1796 
 
Of course, the results in this study do not hint that America is actually on 
the verge of despotism and tyranny.  However, they do make it difficult to 
refute the powerful influence of factionalism and partisanship in the arena of the 
modern politics. The data from my regression suggest the reality that 
Americans with low political knowledge largely determine their policy preference 
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by the use of partisan proxies.   Therefore, when party ID, as the point of 
relation between respondent and proxy, serves as the determinant of policy 
preference, a serious deviation from the original dogma of democracy becomes a 
real possibility. Though scholars such as Lupia and Popkin argue that such 
concerns are overstated and that instead, an academic focus should be aimed at 
examining the conditions that allow for effective proxy use, it is difficult to 
ignore the impact of using “insufficient proxies”. 
Among Americans at or below 133% FPL, I have shown that party ID and 
partisan motivated reasoning, when faced with low policy comprehension, 
encourage the use of familiar proxies to determine policy preference.  These 
findings not only suggest the pervasive influence of partisanship on American 
mass opinion, but also speak to the potential futility of future health reform 
efforts that are made without bipartisan support.  Additionally, my results 
demonstrate the need for a dissemination of information about what PPACA will 
do to benefit the American poor. One potential topic of future research could be 
an assessment of whether or not providing information about Medicaid 




On a final note, as the country now awaits the verdict of the Supreme 
Court on the constitutionality of PPACA, what will it say about the state of 
American politics if such partisan influence extends into, or appears to extend 
into, the court?  If the Supreme Court justices make their decisions on their new 
law based on partisanship, as 50% of Americans believe they will (Steinhauser 
2012), what will this suggest about the state of current American politics?  
Even though the Constitution insulates the Supreme Court from a reactionary 
public, and thus partisanship should have no effect on the court’s decision-
making, there is no doubt that a decision to strike down PPACA on party lines 
would only heighten the already stark dissention between parties.  Especially 
given that this lawsuit had been considered laughable by many of the country’s 
leading legal experts (Rosen 2010) what will it mean if such a monumental 
reform is struck down in this fashion?  The implications of this decision are 































The AMA (American Medical 
Association) has suggested a plan for 
medical care for the aged that would 
have everyone who could afford it 
covered by private health insurance. 
Those who couldn’t afford it would be 
covered under a government health 
plan. Would you favor or oppose such 
a plan?  
 





It has been proposed that Congress 
pass a comprehensive health insurance 
program which would combine federal 
government, employer, and employee 
contributions into one health insurance 
system that would cover all medical 
and health expenses.  Opponents say 
that would get the federal government 
too much into medicine and healthcare.  
Supporters say such insurance is 
necessary for people to obtain proper 
coverage.  Do you favor or oppose 
such a comprehensive federal health 
insurance program? 
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such a comprehensive federal health 
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pass a comprehensive health insurance 
program which would combine federal 
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People were asked whether or not they 
favored or opposed "a universal health 
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 insurance system, with both 







As you know Congress may pass some 
form of national health insurance in the 
current session.  Do you favor some 
form of such legislation? 
 





If familiar, do you approve or 
disapprove of Truman’s plan of 
compulsory health insurance? 
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ORC How much would you like to see the 
federal government do on each of the 
following: providing medical 
insurance for doctor and hospital bills-
























What do you think should be done, if 
anything, so that people can get the 
hospital and medical care they need 




























The government ought to help people 
get doctors and hospital care at low 
cost.  People were asked whether they 
agreed or disagreed and whether their 
















The government ought to help people 
get doctors and hospital care at low 
cost.  People were asked whether they 
agreed or disagreed and whether their 



























The government ought t help people 
get doctors and hospital care at low 
cost.  Do you have an opinion of this 
or not? If YES: Do you agree the 
government should do this or do you 


























Some say the government in 
Washington ought to help people get 
doctors and hospital care at low cost; 
others say the government should not 
get into this.  Have you been interested 
enough in this to favor one side or the 
other? If Yes: what is your position? 
Should the Government in Washington 
help people get doctors and hospital 
care at low costs, or should the 
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There is much concern about the rapid 
rise in medical and hospital costs.  
Some feel there should be a 
government health insurance plan, 
which would cover all medical and 
hospital expenses.  Others feel that 
medical expenses should be paid by 
individuals and through private 
insurance like Blue Cross.  Where 
would you place yourself on this scale 
















There is much concern about the rapid 
rise in medical and hospital costs.  
Some feel there should be a 
government health insurance plan, 
which would cover all medical and 
hospital expenses.  Others feel that 
medical expenses should be paid by 
individuals and through private 
insurance like Blue Cross.  Where 
would you place yourself on this scale 































Congress may soon pass some form of 
national health insurance partly paid 
for out of taxes.  From among those 
listed on his card, who would you 
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